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Resistance to control – Norwegian ministries’ and agencies’ 
reactions to performance audit 
 
Abstract 
Ministries are increasingly subject to control, primarily by State Audit Institutions’. This 
control is assumed to contribute to improvement. Based on survey data from 353 civil 
servants in Norway this article analyses the ministries’ and agencies’ responses to the SAIs 
control. The analysis shows that civil servants in the ministries tend to be less positive to 
performance audit than civil servants in the agencies. Top executives, irrespective of 
administrative level, were more negative than middle managers and other public employees. 
In addition civil servants more exposed to performance audit were, in general, more negative 
towards it.  
 
Key words: Agencies, ministries, Performance audit, State Audit Institution, New Public 
Management, Control 
 
Introduction 
Western societies have increasingly modernized according to New Public Management 
principles (NPM) the last 20-30 years. This NPM ‘regime’ has led to increased delegation 
which in turn has resulted in more use of audit and control mechanisms. Audits and 
evaluations have become important tools in providing information about how public money is 
spent (Power 1997; Pollitt et al. 1999; Hood et al. 1999).  
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There is an inherent tension in this regulatory reform stemming from its dual prescription of 
both enhanced autonomy and control (Roness et al. 2008). Some claim that the control is just 
a ritual of verification with the aim of assurance, but without real effect (Power 1997). Others 
on the contrary claim that control can enhance trust and performance (Möllering 2006; Furubo 
2011). These assumptions are nevertheless contested and more empirical research is needed to 
verify them.  
 
The State Audit Institution (SAI) is a major control institution in a country. Its main task is 
control, but a secondary goal is to contribute to improvement in the audited entities  
(Lonsdale and Bechberger 2011). Performance audit is one method that the SAI uses to assure 
efficient and effective use of public funds.  
 
Both ministries and subordinate entities are objects of the SAIs control, but it is the ministries 
that are held formally accountable. This type of audit is supposed to be more geared towards 
controlling results than checking compliance to rules. The aim is to assess performance by 
investigating public organization’s dispositions and results. This is in contrast to financial 
audit where the auditors check if a public organization has given an accurate account of its 
financial transactions (Christensen et al. 2007). In practice the SAIs nevertheless publish 
different types of reports focusing on results, processes or compliance and they provide 
explanations to varying degrees (Grönlund, Svärdsten, & Öhman, 2011; Put, 2011). Primarily 
they audit control systems rather than efficiency and effectiveness, which are central to their 
mandate (Pollitt et al. 1999). 
 
In general we speak of three types of control. Ex ante control – systems of planning and target 
setting, ex nunc control – systems for monitoring and ex post control, systems of evaluation, 
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rewards, sanctions and feedback (Verhoest et al. 2010, p 24). The SAIs control primarily 
conducts ex post control. In this article we seek to understand the audited civil servants’ 
reactions to this control. These reactions can be important for the SAIs impact.  
 
The research question in this article is: What are the audited civil servants’, in ministries and 
agencies, perceptions about the SAIs performance audit reports and how can we understand 
their reactions? The study is based on data from a questionnaire. The responses of 217 civil 
servants working in ministries and agencies were selected for the analysis.  
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First background information, 
definitions and concepts are presented. Then theory, the method, the empirical results follow. 
Lastly a discussion and conclusion are provided. 
 
Ministries and agencies in Norway 
The task of public administration has traditionally been to prepare cases for political bodies 
(such as laws, instructions, budgets etc.) and implement the measures decided by these same 
bodies (casehandling, administer and supervise grants etc) (Christensen et al. 2010).  
 
In the 1980s and 1990, ensuing growth of public administration and extended work tasks, 
public administrative reform swept through most western states.  Organizational structures 
were changed and private sector management ideas and techniques were introduced, including 
the establishment of agencies (Pollitt 2003; Verhoest et al. 2010).  
 
In Norway the use of agencies can be traced back to the 1850’ies (Lægreid et al. 2011). At 
present a number of state agencies are responsible for policy implementation. The agencies 
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are relatively autonomous (Verhoest et al. 2010). 17 small ministries are responsible for 
policy formulation and planning. The other Scandinavian countries have similar 
organizational set ups, the Swedish agencies being the most autonomous. Some agencies have 
boards or a corporate body that is responsible for making policy for the organization. This is 
considered a Scandinavian model (Pollitt 2003). The main organizing principle in the 
Norwegian ministries is purpose. In addition there is a clear trend to project organize in the 
Norwegian public administration with task forces set up to solve different problems 
(Christensen et al. 2010). 
 
These institutional forms matter, in shaping individual actors’ strategies, preferences and 
identities (March and Olsen 1989). This is due to the limitation of focus that the 
organizational structure imposes. Given bounded rationality individuals center their attention 
on certain problems, solutions, consequences, and conflicts, while ignoring others (Simon 
1997; Egeberg and Trondal 2009). Policy choices are affected by the organizational context 
within which they are made.  
 
Compared with their counterparts in ministerial departments, agency officials exercise their 
discretion relatively insulated from ongoing political processes at the cabinet level and pay 
significantly less attention to signals from executive politicians than their counterparts in 
ministerial departments. In ministerial departments, on the other hand, top priority is given to 
signals from the minister. Considerably less emphasis is attached to user and client interests 
(Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Egeberg 2012). The ministries are thus more responsive to 
political signals than the agencies, and the agencies are more concerned with the professions 
perspective, the client’s and user’s perspectives when making decisions (Christensen et al. 
2010). 
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The fact that agency officials in general are less exposed to political control than their 
counterparts in ministerial departments means that there might be more leeway for expert-
based decision making, or for taking other concerns into consideration within agencies, such 
as, for example, user and clientele interests. Agencies are supposed to enjoy some autonomy 
from their respective ministerial departments as regards decision making, including decision 
making in managerial, personnel, and budgetary matters. However, the respective ministers 
normally keep the political responsibility for agencies’ activities (Egeberg and Trondal 2009).  
 
Prior research on the relationships between ministries and agencies has demonstrated that the 
agencies’ actual autonomy can be ambiguous and do not automatically match their formal 
autonomy (Yesilkagit and Van Thiel 2008; Verhoest et al. 2004; Christensen and Lægreid 
2006a). There are differences in the level of trust between the agencies and their ministries 
which affects the ministries’ ability to control the agencies (Lægreid et al. 2006). There can 
also  be systematic differences in the perceptions of the civil servants in ministries and 
agencies pertaining to control (Reichborn- Kjennerud 2013).  
 
In the Norwegian system the primary responsibility of the ministers is objective. The 
Norwegian ministers are held accountable for their actions and the actions of civil servants in 
subordinate entities (Rose 1987). This means that ministers have to assume responsibility for 
events that they personally cannot be blamed for. This principle has been weakened in later 
years as the Parliament, faced with minority governments after the second world war, have 
not always respected the rule that only ministers can be held to account (Sejersted 2002; 
Nordby 2004). 
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The principle of ministerial responsibility is important for the Parliament to be able to conduct 
its control. It simplifies the process and it motivates the minister to prevent misconduct 
(Nordby 2004). The ministries support this principle, even though the increased devolution 
over the last years, has significantly weakened their powers (Christensen and Lægreid 2006b).  
The Norwegian ministries have both administrative tasks as well as a more political role in 
assisting in the development of policies. In this role as a secretariat for the political leadership 
civil servants assist the minister in formulating political issues during the policy processes that 
goes on in the Government and the Parliament. In more than 40 years it has been stated as an 
ambition to develop this function better and it is assumed that this will improve sectorial 
coordination that traditionally has been weak in Norway (Christensen and Lægreid 2006b). 
The accountability relation between the SAI and the ministries 
In most instances of political accountability it is only the top of the organization that is called 
to account externally. This is called hierarchical accountability. SAIs are not in a direct 
hierarchical relationship to public organizations, nor do they have any formal sanctioning 
power. They report to Parliament. This can be described as a diagonal relationship. In this 
diagonal relationship the SAI reports to Parliament that, in its turn, can inflict sanctions. From 
this relation the SAI derives an informal power (Bovens 2007).  
 
In this article “holding to account” is understood as the ministries’ obligation to answer for 
the execution of their responsibilities to Parliament (Bemelmans-Videc et al. 2007, p.241). 
The ministries are answerable to Parliament also for separate or semi-detached public 
organizations and expenditure that is not under their direct control (Rose 1987). Internally in 
their own organization leaders are organizationally accountable (Bovens 2005). 
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With new methods of control, the SAIs role has increased in importance. Its mandate, in 
performance audit, is to establish whether public policies, programmes, projects or 
organisations have operated with due regard to economy, efficiency, effectiveness and good 
management practice (Donaldson and Lipsey, 2006; Johnsen et al., 2001; Lonsdale, 2000; 
Pollitt et al., 1999; Power, 1997).  Consequently it now deals with politically relevant matters 
and does not limit itself to checking state accounts. At the same time it has become more 
controversial (Christensen et al. 2002).  
 
The performance audit reports are intended to contribute to improved operations in the 
audited entities. They can be used by the Parliament and its control committee to hold the 
ministries to account for unsatisfactory performance, management practice or lack of 
compliance in its policy area (Lægreid 2013). In this control the SAI has an instrumental 
rationality in that it expects the ministries to improve based on its detection of deviance. This 
line of thinking is equally present in the Norwegian control system called “Management by 
Objectives and Results” (MBOR) (Lægreid et al. 2006). The supposition is that organizational 
performance can be improved through control and performance reporting. This was also an 
important assumptions in classical management theory and scientific management (Morin 
2008; Taylor 1967; Fayol and Gray 1988; Christensen et al. 2007).  
 
The relation between Parliament, the cabinet, the government departments and agencies can 
be perceived as a range of principal-agent relationships. In a principal-agent relationship the 
agent will act according to his or her own interests and primarily disclose information that is 
beneficiary to him- or herself. Public-sector agencies are assumed to be self-interested bodies 
that are controlled through specified performance contracts. It is therefore not a relationship 
predominantly based on trust, but on control. The agent is held to account for its use of public 
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resources. It risks consequences and sanctions if it underperforms. (Lægreid et al. 2006). Still, 
in practice, this relationship is also based on trust to run smoothly (Christensen et al. 2006). 
Performance audit and impact 
The auditors chose the topic of their performance audits themselves. In these choices a 
number of factors are influential, such as the volume of public resources involved in an 
activity, political salience and the likely risk to public funds. They also strive to achieve a 
systematic coverage of audit fields over a period of years and follow up on topics where 
earlier audits demonstrated that there were problems (Lonsdale et al. 1999). Performance 
audit is an under-researched topic, especially when it comes to its impact. In a review of 
existing research on the influence of performance audit, only 14 studies pertaining to state 
audit were found (Van Loocke and Put 2011). Many of the studies on the impact of 
performance audit are based on the perceptions of those audited (Morin 2008, 2004, 2001). 
Recent studies suggest that the auditees perceived utility of the performance audit depends on 
their perception of the quality of the report and of the SAI as an institution, as well as on their 
experiences in the process and the degree to which their comments were taken into account 
(Alwardat 2010; Reichborn- Kjennerud 2013). Several authors  also problematized the 
independent role of auditors as being an obstacle to impact because stakeholder involvement 
is associated with greater utilization (Vanlandingham 2011; Reichborn-Kjennerud and 
Johnsen 2011). Justesen and Skærbek (2010)  looked into how accountability mechanisms 
contributed to the auditors’ impact and suggested that these are forceful mechanisms in  
making organizations implement changes. Still they questioned whether the changes 
necessarily improved matters.  Other researchers have focused on learning processes from and 
success factors for performance audit stressing the importance of the compatibility of the 
opinions of the auditor and the auditee (De Vries et al. 2000; Van der Meer 1999). Lapsley 
and Pong (2000) and Lonsdale (1999) based the assessment of impact on the opinion of the 
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auditors themselves. There is also some research on the impact of audit institutions at the 
local level (Weets 2011; Johnsen et al. 2001; Tillema and Ter Bogt 2010).  
Theory 
I apply three different perspectives to understand the civil servant’s perception of the SAI’s 
reports. The first two perspectives concern how characteristics internal to organizations 
influence the civil servants. The organizational perspective emphasizes the importance of 
formal structure and the cultural-institutional perspective emphasizes internal organizational 
cultures. Lastly the demographic perspective concerns extra-organizational influences; 
cultural traits that employees bring with them into the organization.  
An organizational perspective 
According to Egeberg (2012) an organization’s structure is normative and composed of rules 
and roles. The structure defines interests and goals and specifies who is expected to do what 
and how. Because of this and because of bounded rationality the organization is never neutral 
and represents bias in preparation of action. This contributes in explaining organizational 
behavior.  
 
An organization is specialized vertically and horizontally. In general, vertical specialization 
seems to diminish the potential for political steering and control. In the vertical dimension the 
officials’ level of position is correlated with the contact they have with the political leadership 
and the emphasis put on political signals. Those with few horizontal contacts and who identify 
themselves with lower level units are considering only a narrow range of problems, solutions 
and consequences, while those who conceive of themselves as parts of more over-arching 
entities and have extensive lateral relations, are likely to address broader agendas. Officials in 
central agencies, in contrast to officials in the ministries, attach most importance to 
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professional and expert considerations. They are more insulated from ongoing political 
processes at the cabinet level and from Parliament. They have fewer opportunities to 
influence decision makers at the ministerial level. More attention is also paid to signals for 
user and client groups at the agency level than at the ministry level. Empirical studies have 
also confirmed that formal hierarchies and boundaries is the most important factor in 
explaining the civil servants’ identity-formation in ministries and agencies. This influences 
their decision-making, actions and attitudes (Egeberg and Saetren 1999). 
 
Civil servants in ministries are more involved in assisting the minister in developing policies. 
They may therefore be more skeptical to external scrutiny as the SAIs critique of the 
ministries indirectly affects them (Christensen and Lægreid 2006b). Agency officials, on the 
other hand, are at arm’s length from the decisions and priorities in the ministry which makes 
them less vulnerable to critique (Egeberg and Trondal 2009). Performance audits focusing on 
the agencies’ policy area might prove positive for them. Critique from the SAI could mean 
increased funding from the ministries. Agencies are also less vulnerable than ministries to 
political critique often implicit in audit reports. Civil servants in agencies are therefore 
hypothesized to be more positive to the reports: 
 
H1: The civil servants in the agencies will be more positive towards performance audit than 
will those working in ministries. 
 
The same mechanisms described for administrative levels above, apply also internally in 
organizations. Leaders, as opposed to lower level employees, have more horizontal contacts, 
consider a broader range of problems and are more exposed to processes of hierarchical 
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accountability (Bovens 2005). They are equally supposed to make use of the SAIs reports to 
improve. This might make them more vulnerable to criticism. The hypothesis thus is: 
 
H2: The more leader responsibility the less positive the civil servant will be towards 
performance audit.  
 
A cultural-institutional perspective 
The second theoretical perspective focuses on informal culture in organizations. Civil 
servant’s informal norms and values generate value-bearing institutions. These institutions are 
characterized by their own identities and opinions about what is appropriate behavior. Norms, 
values and identities are developed gradually and are internalized by the members of an 
organization through socialization processes. Civil servants’ identify with their place of work. 
Loyalties to their workplace and values affect their understanding of their role. Thus civil 
servants with a long administrative career in a ministry or an agency will have other 
perceptions and values than employees recruited from the private sector or civil servants with 
a political background (Lægreid and Olsen 1978; Christensen and Lægreid 2006b). In 
addition accountability relations to elected officeholders and the citizenry, enhanced by 
increased monitoring of the public administration, also affect the understanding of their role 
(Peters 2010; Waldo 2006). The basic idea according to this perspective is that aspects of 
organizational culture affect whether and how behavior is regarded as appropriate. Through 
experience with this institutional culture members learn how to behave (March and Olsen 
1989; Selznick 1984).  
 
Patterns of path dependent behavior that are seen as appropriate become reinforced over time 
and are therefore quite resistant to change. Internal forces contributing to the organization’s 
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robustness and stability become more important than signals and pressure from superior 
bodies (Krasner 1988). The main types of explanatory factors according to this perspective 
are connected with these constraints inherent in established traditions and cultures as they 
have developed over time The fate of external reform initiatives from the SAI will depend on 
whether and how they are compatible with established norms and values in the ministries and 
agencies (Brunsson and Olsen 1993). Being preoccupied with defending their institutionalized 
practice and culture they will be skeptical to external criticism. Staying in an institutional 
context over a longer period of time will strengthen the socialization and the identification 
with the institution, making it harder to take a different perspective. We thus hypothesize: 
 
H3: The longer the civil servants have worked at their workplace the less positive perception 
they will have of the performance audit. 
 
Civil servants exposure to continuous pressure strengthens“in-group” dynamics that reinforce 
identification with  internal values (Ashforth and Mael 1989). We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H4: The more often civil servants have experienced performance audit the less positive 
perception they will have of it. 
 
A demographic perspective 
The civil servants in public organizations are not only organizational actors. They are also 
embedded in a wider institutional environment. Through their individual careers and their 
socio-economic backgrounds, they bring with them certain individual traits and characteristics 
when they start at a place of work. In the recruitment of civil servants education and 
professional qualification are emphasized. These aspects are therefore key to consider. 
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Education provides them with knowledge and skills, but just as much with values, loyalties 
and identifications. Where the civil servants come from, in terms of education and work 
experience, thus matter for their understanding of their role (Christensen and Lægreid 2008; 
Lægreid and Olsen 1978; Christensen and Lægreid 2006b). The norms and values they bring 
with them can affect the way they look at audit. 
 
In this analysis we will particularly focus on educational differences. We do this because the 
civil servants’ ability and interest in standing up to a SAI can be conceived as a question of 
competency and assertiveness. This will be linked to educational background. Occupation is 
generally a good indicator of an agents’ position and status, as is educational background 
(Bourdieu 1987, 1984). The education and professional backgrounds that individuals bring 
with them contribute in shaping their opinions and decisions, including their perceptions of 
the SAI (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). 
 
Civil servants with higher education will be better able to assess the SAIs report because they 
have an education that gives them both the confidence and the ability to do it. Thus they will 
not automatically acquiesce the conclusions, but be more skeptical (Christensen and Lægreid 
2005). Different professions bring with them values and ways of conceiving reality that will 
affect how they interpret their role as civil servants. Social scientists tend to work with 
planning, analysis and reporting (Christensen et al. 2010, chapter 5). In this work they apply 
discretion to a large extent. The evaluative work that the SAI perform in performance audit 
primarily demands such social science competencies. The social scientists know that the 
reports need not be perceived as facts and that discretion and methods on the part of the 
auditors can be questioned. This will incline civil servants having social science backgrounds 
to be more critical towards the reports than civil servants with natural science or historic 
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philosophic backgrounds (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). An objection  to this allegation 
could be that social scientists, including economists, would endorse evaluations and 
performance audits because they are more positive to the rational perspective of goal-
attainment in contrast for example to the jurists’ focus on compliance (Eckhoff and Jacobsen 
1960) . But because the SAIs assessments are critical of the civil servants themselves it is 
hypothesized that they turn critical.  
 
How different professions and auditees in general will react to performance audit could 
potentially depend on the subject and the type of performance audit. Recent research 
nevertheless demonstrates that this is not the case. Instead the auditees’ experience with the 
performance audit process, their perception of the report quality and the SAI is what matters 
(Reichborn- Kjennerud 2013).  
 
What determines differences in the perception of report quality? The hypothesis below 
assume that professions more trained in evaluative thinking would be more prone to question 
the SAI. 
 
H5: The less the civil servants are educated in social science disciplines the more positive 
perceptions they will have of the performance audit. 
 
Data and methods 
The data collection method adopted was that of a survey. Inquiries were sent to the public 
institutions that had experienced performance audit between 2005 and 2010. The institutions 
that received inquiries were asked to provide the e-mail addresses of employees who had 
experienced performance audit. Inquiries were then sent to the employees explaining the 
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purpose of the study and informing them of their rights. Subsequently, a web-based 
questionnaire was sent to the employees.  Reminders were sent out to respondents who had 
not answered by a certain deadline. 
The questionnaire was designed in such a way that the respondents were asked to answer 
questions pertaining to the particular performance audit(s) they themselves had experienced. 
In the questionnaire, there were questions seeking to reveal both the civil servant’s 
perceptions of performance audit and their professional backgrounds. The questions were 
designed based on previous research (Morin 2004; Pollitt et al. 1999; Power 1997) and 
validated by research colleagues, ministry and agency employees as well as one director 
general and two methodology experts from the Norwegian SAI. A pilot study was conducted 
with nine respondents prior to sending out the survey in spring 2011. 
 
A total of 520 questionnaires were distributed. After screening out those who were unable to 
answer because of absence, sickness or who were wrongly chosen for participation, 471 valid 
e-mail addresses remained. The number of responses was 353, corresponding to a response 
rate of 74%. The data file was further reduced to 217, to include only employees from the 
ministries and the agencies. This included 112 civil servants from ministries (52 percent) and 
105 from agencies (48 percent). 48 percent of the 217 respondents were middle managers, 11 
percent were top executives and 42 percent were lower level civil servants. 
 
In the analysis we used logistic regression. In the logistic regression the dependent variable 
was the extent to which the respondents agreed to the allegations that the performance 
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audit reports held good quality,  where 1=to a little or very little extent and 2= Neither nor, 
large or very large extent. The variable initially had five ordinal values that were collapsed 
into two, to accommodate the logistic regression. See the distribution below: 
 
Table 1. in about here 
 
 
As can be observed from the table above, approximately 50 percent of the respondents are 
placed in either of the two groups, group 1=little to medium extent (2+17+32=51) or group 2= 
large to very large extent (40+9=49).  
 
The independent variables measuring formal organizational structure was “administrative 
level” with the values 1= ministry and 2=agency and “current position” with the values 1=top 
executive, 2=middle manager and 3=other public employees. 
 
The independent variables measuring informal organizational structure was “the number of 
performance audits experienced” with the values 1= one performance audit, 2=two 
performance audits and 3= three or more performance audits and “years of service” with the 
values 1=5 years or less, 2=6-10 years and 3=11 years or more 
 
The Independent variable measuring demography was “type of education” with the values 
1=social science background and 2= other educational backgrounds 
 
First we explored the bivariate relations with the dependent variable using cross-tabulations. 
Second we controlled the effect of the independent variables in a logistic regression analysis. 
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Findings: Reactions to the SAIs reports 
To understand why auditees react differently to the reports we first explored the relation of the 
independent and dependent variables in bivariate analyses.  
 
Table 2. in about here 
 
 
The crosstable analyses demonstrates that civil servants in the agencies were more positive to 
the reports than the ministries. Top executives were less positive to performance audit than 
middle managers and other employees. This result was not significant. Civil servants having 
experienced many performance audits were less positive to the reports than those that had 
only experienced one or two. Equally those educated within the social sciences were less 
positive to the reports than civil servants with another educational background. Civil servants 
having worked five years or less were more positive to the reports than those having worked 
longer, but these results were not significant. We included all the independent variables in the 
subsequent logistic regression: 
 
Table 3. in about here 
 
As the table 7 above shows civil servants working in agencies are more than three times as 
likely to think that the quality of the SAI reports is good than civil servants working in 
ministries (OR=3,676; CI 3,322-4,030). Civil servants with no leader responsibilities are more 
than three times as likely as top executives to perceive of the report as good (OR=3,550; CI 
2,969-4,131), while middle managers are almost four times as likely than top executives to 
perceive of the report as good (OR=3,846; CI 3,288-4,404). Civil servants having experienced 
more than three reports were more than twice as negative (OR=0,310, CI -0,271-0,891) than 
18 
 
civil servants having experienced one report. Type of education and length of service did not 
significantly predict the civil servant’s perception of the reports.  
 
Discussion 
How do the auditees react to the SAI reports? Findings indicate that half of the civil servants 
working in ministries and agencies are positive and half of them are negative or indifferent. 
The auditees tend to become more negative if they are exposed to many performance audits. 
Civil servants in ministries also are more negative to performance audit than civil servants in 
agencies. Equally top executives are more negative to performance audit than middle 
managers and civil servants without leader responsibility. 
 
The organizational perspective 
The structural features of an organization can influence the way its members think and act 
(Christensen et al. 2007). Our expectation was that the civil servants in ministries would be 
more negative to performance audit than the civil servants in agencies (H1). The 
crosstabulations and the subsequent logistic regression demonstrated that the civil servants in 
the ministries were more critical to the SAIs reports than the agencies. This can be understood 
on the basis of their structural hierarchical position. The ministries and agencies have 
different interests and tasks. The ministries are the ones formally held to account in a 
performance audit. At the same time their role is to protect and assist the minister in 
development of policies, implement his or her policies, prioritize programs and operations and 
distribute resources accordingly. They will, therefore, be more sensitive to criticism. At the 
same time their ability to remedy weaknesses are limited as the concrete tasks most often are 
conducted by separate or semi-attached public organizations.  
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The agencies, on the other hand, are the ones conducting the concrete tasks. They have more 
knowledge of the subject matter. Also they are not formally held to account. At the same time 
the attention that the performance audit report triggers enhance their chances of getting more 
attention and resources to their policy area.  This might explain why they are less critical.  
Their responses are rationality bounded by their position in the organization (Selznick 1984).  
 
We expected the same mechanisms, described for administrative levels above, to apply 
internally in organizations (H2). The results show that top executives were more negative than 
middle managers and civil servants to the performance audit reports. This indicates that the 
people who are responsible find it uncomfortable to be held to account. This seems to apply 
both to administrative level and positions internal to an organization. There is little reason to 
believe that top executives are better at judging the quality of the SAIs reports than the middle 
managers or the general employee. Neither are civil servants in ministries necessarily better at 
judging the quality of the reports than civil servants in agencies. Agencies, rather than 
ministries, are likely to know more about the daily operations than civil servants in the 
ministries. Top executives and civil servants in the ministries are, nevertheless, the ones that 
must stand up and take the blame on behalf of the organization, and potentially face the 
consequences. They are also the ones responsible for making priorities. With performance 
audit the SAI increasingly questions the efficiency and effectiveness of operations, closing in 
on the question of priorities and politics. These findings indicate that this makes ministries 
and top executives uncomfortable. 
 
The cultural-institutional perspective 
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The first hypothesis of the cultural-institutional perspective was rejected (H3). The fact that 
the variable “length of service” was not significant in the analysis demonstrates that a culture 
skeptical towards the SAI does not automatically develop over time.  
 
The fourth hypothesis was confirmed (H4). Those that had experienced many performance 
audits were less likely to think the reports were good. This indicates that control-overload can 
be negative for the perception of performance audit and that it might lead to a critical stance 
towards the SAI internally in organizations. At the same time, whether this happens or not 
will also depend on how many employees in the same division or department was affected by 
the investigation. If many employees in the same department share antagonistic feelings 
towards the SAI it is more probable that negativity will develop. Feelings of contrariety and 
loss of legitimacy caused by several performance audit reports might spur resistance in the 
audited entities (Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
 
The fact that the SAI directs several investigations to the same sector or unit might be 
structurally determined. If a policy area receives a large part of the state budget it will be 
salient in the SAIs risk analyses and will often be prioritized for investigation. In addition, as 
the ministries are formally accountable, all audits conducted in a given policy area will finally 
involve ministry employees implying that they will experience more performance audit than 
lower level civil servants. Still, as the logistic regression shows, being exposed to many 
performance audits has an effect independent of administrative level. There need therefore not 
only be structural reasons for the continued attention from the SAI.  
 
Several performance audits directed towards the same sector and policy area might also 
indicate that the audited entity, according to the SAI, has large issues to correct. 
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Dissatisfaction therefore need not indicate control overload, but justified control because of 
mismanagement and discomfort linked to deficiencies being discovered. 
 
The demographic perspective 
H5 of the demographic perspective had to be rejected. Type of education seemed not to 
impact on the civil servants perception of the report. The bivariate analyses demonstrated that 
civil servants with a social scientist education were less positive to the SAIs reports than civil 
servants with other educational backgrounds. In the logistic regression this factor was no 
longer significant. The reason why this factor did not come out as an independent causal 
factor can be related to the fact that there are relatively more social scientists working in the 
ministries than in the agencies.  
 
Conclusions 
Civil servants, whether working in ministries or in agencies, are quite positive to the SAIs 
reports. Still, employees become more negative to performance audit if they have experienced 
many of them. Those working in ministries are also more negative than civil servants in 
ministries and top executives are more negative than middle managers and civil servants.  
 
How can we interpret these differences?  That civil servants more exposed to performance 
audit are more negative can be interpreted as a reaction to control overload. It can equally be 
an expression of a skepticism having developed internally in organization, towards the SAI. 
This could at least be the case when several civil servants in the same divisions or 
departments have been exposed at the same time, which is often the case. Alternatively it can 
indicate discomfort linked to the fact that mismanagement has been discovered. 
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The fact that civil servants in ministries are more negative than civil servants in agencies is 
related to their structural position. Ministries are formally accountable and at the same time 
address broader agendas and make priorities for several subunits. Their skepticism indicates 
that they don’t like the SAI to interfere with their priorities. Officials in central agencies, in 
contrast to officials in the ministries, depend on the ministries priorities and resource 
allocations. The fact that they appreciate the attention given to their policy area demonstrates 
that they often profit from the attention of the SAI. The same mechanisms that apply in this 
hierarchical accountability relation seem to be manifest internally in organizations. Top 
executives are more negative towards the performance audit reports than middle managers 
and civil servants without leader responsibility, reflecting that they must take the blame as 
responsible for priorities and resource allocations (Christensen and Lægreid 2006b). Blame 
avoidance is identified as a significant driver in civil servants’ behavior (Hood 2007). Three 
ways of avoiding blame is identified; diverting public attention with excuses or keeping a low 
profile, trying to force other actors to assume responsibility by delegating responsibility and 
adherence to rules and norms. Blame avoidance can lead to fear of doing things in new ways 
because of the risks it entails (Hood 2011). These mechanisms could be interesting to pursue 
in further research in the case of the SAI. 
 
This article contributes generally to the literature on the significance of organizational 
structure, and more specifically to knowledge on the differences between perceptions and 
identities in ministries and agencies respectively. It also contributes to the literature on 
performance audit, and more specifically to the influence of performance audit on public 
administration. Lastly it contributes to the literature on responses to institutional pressures, 
and more specifically to responses to audit.
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Tables 
 
Table 1. The respondent’s perception of the report quality 
 
 Do you agree that the performance audit report held good quality. Percent 
  
 
To a very little extent 2 
To a little extent 17 
Neither nor 32 
To a large extent 40 
To a very large extent 9 
N=100% 195 
 
Table 2. Perception of report quality by structural, cultural and demographic features. 
Crosstabulations. Percent. 
 
The report held good quality 
 Quality of audit reports   
 Bad/medium Good/very 
good 
Significance N=100% 
Organizational features:     
Administrative level     
Ministry 65 35 P=0.00 105 
Agency 34 66 P=0.00 90 
Position     
Top executive 70 30 P=0.121 23 
Middle manager 46 54 P=0.121 92 
Employee without leader- 
responsibilities 
51 49 
P=0.121 80 
Cultural-institutional features     
Number of performance audits     
One performance audit 33 67 P=0,001 61 
Two performance audits 52 48 P=0,001 52 
Three or more performance audits 66 34 P=0,001 76 
Tenure     
5 years or less 48 52 P=0,875 56 
6-10 years 53 47 P=0,875 45 
11 years or more 51 49 P=0,875 94 
Demographic features     
Profession     
Education within the social 
sciences 
65 35 
P=0,043 40 
Other educational background 47 53 P=0,043 119 
 
Table 3. Logistic regression showing the civil servants tendency to perceive the report as good  
The report held good quality 
 P-value OR (Odds Ratio) CI (Confidence Interval) 
Organizational features 
Administrative level 
Ministry  1 (ref)  
Agency 0.000 3,676 3,322-4,030 
Current position 
Top executive  1 (ref)  
Middle manager 0.016 3,846 3,288-4,404 
Civil servant 0,029 3,550 2,969-4,131 
Cultural-Institutional features 
Number of performance audits experienced 
One  1 (ref)  
Two 0.253 0,617 0,194-1,040 
Three or more 0.004 0,310 -0,271-0,891 
Years of service 
5 years or less  1 (ref)  
6-10 years 0,586 0,781 0,328-1,234 
11 years or more 0,775 0,896 -0,510-1,282 
Demographic features 
Type of education 
Social science  1 (ref)  
Other 0,575 1,260 0,848-1,672 
 
 
